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This article reviews various different growth models, with
emphasis on the interactions between economies with differing
degrees of technological development. It takes as its starting
point the proposals put forward by ECLAC in the 1950s
(section II); as subsequent proposals by ECLAC in the 1980s
and 1990s have incorporated various contributions made by
more recent models it may be asserted that the evolution of
ECLAC’s ideas likewise illustrates the evolution of economic
growth theory in general. It then goes on to analyse endogenous
growth models with monopolistic competition conditions of the
neoclassical school (section III), presents Schumpeterian
models of what has been called the “evolutionary school”
(section IV), and describes the thinking of the “new
ECLAC” of the 1980s and 1990s and its conceptual and
propositional renewal (section V). It then compares the
different models and approaches analysed in the light of some
aspects considered to be of key importance, such as the role
assigned to endogenous technical progress in explaining
long-term economic growth, the way the different conceptions
of technology condition the nature of public intervention to
promote development, and the validity of the concepts of
bipolarity and/or international divergence with respect to the
long-term growth rates of the per capita product (section VI).
The final considerations (section VII) contain some reflections
on aspects relating to development policies, both from the
standpoint of the various approaches reviewed earlier and
from that of the special structural features typical of the Latin
American economies.







Since the mid-1980s –partly because of the
appearance of new growth models– there has been a
revival of interest in the processes of convergence or
divergence of the growth rates of the product or of
per capita income between the different economies.
This study proposes to review those models1 from a
perspective which stresses the interactions of
economies with different degrees of technological
development.
As our starting point, we have taken the ideas
and proposals made by ECLAC in the 1950s, which
are referred to in section II. This starting point was
selected for three reasons. The first is that ECLAC
played a pioneering role in the study of the
North-South or Centre-Periphery economic dynamics, to
use its own terminology. The second reason is
connected with the emphasis placed in the initial
ECLAC position on technical progress and its key role
in international convergence or divergence. Indeed,
this was to become one of the leading items in more
recent models. Finally, there is the fact that the
“New ECLAC” –that of the 1980s and 1990s, which is
dealt with in section V– has incorporated various
contributions from those models. Thus, it may be
asserted in general terms that the evolution of
ECLAC’s ideas illustrates the evolution of economic
growth theory as a whole.
Section III analyses the changes in neo-classical
growth theory. In this theory, Solow’s model, which
had a decisive influence up to the mid-1980s and is
to a large extent typical of it, attributed long-term
growth to an exogenous variable: technical progress
(Solow, 1956). More recent theories, called
“endogenous growth theories”, in contrast, seek to
take this variable into account by relating it with the
decisions of the economic agents on investment in
technology. By doing this, they arrive at results
which, like the earliest ECLAC approach, allow for
possible systemic divergences between the growth
rates of different countries which cannot be
addressed through the conventional models.
Section IV presents the Schumpeterian models
of the “evolutionary” school. These models
–especially those that use simulation techniques–
seek to incorporate more fully the diversities of
technological level and behaviour which exist among
firms and countries. The evolutionary school is also
marked by the importance it assigns to the
institutional framework in which technical progress
takes place and the important role of demand in
economic growth. It is argued in the present article
that the models of this school point out some of the
most promising directions for research, partly
because of the greater breadth and realism of their
basic assumptions and partly because of the
flexibility with which these assumptions can be
adapted for the analysis of complex situations.
Section V deals with the ideas of the “New
ECLAC”, as already noted in the paragraph above
concerning section II, and their receptiveness to the
new economic growth theories.
Section VI analyses and compares the different
models and approaches presented, in the light of
some aspects considered to be of key importance,
such as the role attributed to endogenous technical
progress in explaining long-term economic growth;
the way in which the different conceptions of
technology condition the nature of public
intervention in the promotion of development and,
finally, the validity of the concepts of bipolarity
and/or international divergence in the long-term
growth rates of the per capita product.
Finally, section VII reflects on some aspects
relating to development policies, both from the angle
of the different perspectives involved and from the
standpoint of the specific structural features of Latin
American economies.
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1 The term “model” is used here in a similar sense to that given
to it by Schumpeter and therefore includes analytical
formulations in any language: not just that of mathematics (see,
in this respect, Vercelli, 1991, p. 15).




In his 1948 “manifesto”, Raúl Prebisch ascribed the
differences between the level of development of a
group of countries which he termed “central” and the
countries which he termed “peripheral” to the slow
and uneven spread of technical progress through the
international economy.2
The essence of his seminal ideas may be
summed up, very briefly, as follows:3 There are two
groups of countries, differentiated by the characteristics
of their respective economic structures, which form the
two poles of a single system. One of them –the centre–
has a diversified and homogeneous productive and
economic structure:4 diversified, because it is made up
of a relatively broad spectrum of economic activities,
and homogeneous, because labour productivity levels
are relatively similar in all those activities. The
periphery, in contrast, occupies a place in the world
economy based on specialization in primary
commodity production for export and therefore tends
to display a narrower range of activities (for
example, it starts off by lacking a significant
industrial sector). In some of these activities, labour
productivity is high because of the penetration of
technical progress. A large proportion of the labour
force, however, continues to work at jobs of very low
productivity, thus giving rise to a situation of
structural heterogeneity.
In contrast with that of the centres, then, the
production structure of the periphery is initially
heterogeneous and specialized, and this difference
persists in the spontaneous industrialization process
sparked off in the periphery by the crisis of the 1930s
and the Second World War. The basic reason for this
is that technical progress –which is more intense in
industry than in primary production– is likewise
uneven between the two poles.
The disparity in the rates of generation and
incorporation of technical progress, associated with
the initial specialization, means that the spontaneous
industrialization of the periphery begins with the
production of technologically simple manufactures
and gradually progresses towards the production of
industrial goods of growing technological complexity.
This pattern of industrialization, which progresses
from simple to more complex goods through import
substitution, means that while the production
structure of the periphery gradually changes, it
nevertheless remains essentially specialized (for
example, in terms of the degree of intersectoral
complementarity and vertical integration of manufacturing
activities). This repetition of specialization lies at the root
of the trend towards external imbalance, which is due
ultimately to the fact that import substitution
industrialization itself generates snowballing
increases in the demand for imports, while primary
commodity exports grow only slowly.5
Spontaneous industrialization brings with it an
increase in employment, both in manufacturing and
in the other modern activities which grow up along
with it. However, this increase in the demand for
labour does not match the increase in its supply,
because the latter is due to the number of workers
attracted to the cities and, even more so, the labour
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2 At that time, Prebisch’s document entitled “The economic
development of Latin America and its principal problems” came
to be called the “ECLAC Manifesto”. In it, the “slow and
uneven spread of technical progress” was linked for the first
time with the unequal or bipolar nature of development in the
centre-periphery system. This document was also published
later in the Economic Bulletin for Latin America (Prebisch,
1962).
3 The body of ideas of ECLAC has been dealt with in detail in
various documents (Furtado, 1985; Rodríguez, 1981;
Bielschowsky, 1988). In this article, we will limit ourselves to
presenting a very brief summary.
4 The expression “productive structure” refers to the
composition of the output of material goods. The economic
structure includes, in addition, the production of various kinds
of services, including public goods and services.
5 The structural reasons for the external imbalance referred to in
this paragraph are usually presented in terms of the well-known
argument of the disparity between the income-elasticities of
demand for the imports and the exports of the periphery.
displaced from low-productivity activities as a result
of the modernization of agricultural activities.
The result is that the heterogeneity is repeated
too, but this process does not take place without
changes, in what has been called “inward-looking
development”. In this phase, the heterogeneity and
the tendency towards structural underemployment
which reflects it are increasingly evident in urban
areas, through what has come to be known as
marginality or informality.
It could be said, then, that according to the
original ECLAC conception specialization is the
underlying reason for external imbalance, while
heterogeneity lies at the root of structural
underemployment. This conception also holds that
these two structural conditions give rise, together, to
a third tendency: deterioration in the terms of trade.
Increases in labour productivity are more marked in
the central countries, where the relative scarcity of
labour and workers’ capacity for organizing themselves
in trade unions cause increases in productivity to be
reflected in higher wages. For the opposite reasons,
the opposite takes place in the periphery, and the
resulting differences in wages are reflected –through
mechanisms which need not be discussed here– in a
decline in the relative prices of the periphery’s
exports compared with those of its imports which
come from the central countries.
Prebisch holds that this deterioration in the
terms of trade is the visible expression of a deeper
phenomenon: the concentration of the fruits of
technical progress in the great industrial centres. This
means that in those countries the per capita income
tends to grow more than labour productivity, because
they take advantage of part of the increases in
productivity registered in the periphery. In contrast,
per capita income in the periphery tends to grow less
than productivity because the peripheral countries
transfer part of their increased productivity to the
centres, through the deterioration in the relative
prices of their exports.
We have just referred, above, to the differences
in income. These represent the first and most directly
visible aspect of the bipolarity inherent in the
development of the centre-periphery system. The
second salient aspect is the differences between their
productive and economic systems, which tend to
persist or, if you prefer, to be reproduced in new forms.
However, such bipolarity –“divergence”, as it is
called nowadays– is not seen as an inevitable
phenomenon. In order to avoid it, the development
process of the periphery needs to be directed along
certain lines, the most important of which is
industrialization. In other words, it is maintained that
by applying suitable long-term policies it will be
possible to bring about gradual “convergence”
between the two poles of the system, with beneficial
effects for the world economy as a whole. It may be
gathered from this that the question of convergence
or divergence lies at the very heart of the original




In this section we will briefly contrast the traditional
versions of neoclassical growth models with what
have come to be known as “endogenous growth
models” and we will also briefly describe some
models of this type which include monopolistic
competition among their key assumptions. We will
then enter in greater detail into the conception of
technology used in the new models and, finally,
analyse the connotations of this conception as it
affects both convergence or divergence of the per
capita product among different economies and
international trade and public policies.
1. Endogenous growth models
In their traditional versions (Solow, 1956 and 1957),
the neoclassical models start out in general by
assuming the existence of a production function with
two factors –labour and capital– with constant yields
to scale and decreasing returns on each factor. These
models aim to show that, in the absence of technical
progress, in the long term the growth rate of the per
capita GDP will tend to decline to zero.
This tendency is connected with the decreasing
nature of the marginal productivity of capital, for this
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assumption means that the accumulation of this
factor will bring with a decline in its yield, thus
discouraging real investment. In the long term, the
latter will barely be sufficient to cover the
depreciation of the existing capital stock and the
provision of equipment for the new labour entering
the production process. This gives rise to a
steady-growth state in which the product grows at
the same rate as the active population. In contrast
with this basic reasoning, the models in question
show that in order to achieve a higher growth rate
which will enable the per capita product to register
sustained growth, technological change exogenous to
the economic system will be required.
This exogenous nature of the change assumes
that technical progress takes place without the
intervention of the economic agents. The new
endogenous growth models reject this exogenous
character and likewise question the decreasing nature
of the marginal returns on accumulable factors such
as physical and human capital.6 These models assume,
on the one hand, a context of imperfect competition
which makes possible remuneration of intentional
innovation by private entrepreneurs, while on the
other they assume that the externalities generated by
this innovation obviate convergence of the growth rate
of the product towards that of the active population.
Among the models mentioned, the first example
that springs to mind is that of Romer (see Appendix 1).
In this model (Romer, 1990), economic growth
comes from the heightening of the division of labour
achieved through the incorporation of technical
progress, which is reflected in the creation of new
varieties of capital goods which are neither better nor
worse than the existing ones.7 In this model, then,
technical progress operates through the horizontal
differentiation of such goods. This wider range of
capital goods makes it possible to increase the social
division of labour, permitting each producer of final
goods to find the most suitable instruments for the
purpose which will give him greater productivity of
physical capital, human capital and unskilled labour.
In the model by Aghion and Howitt (1992),
growth comes directly from technical progress, which
is in turn the result of competition among the firms
that produce innovations. Each innovation generates
a new type of capital good whose use will improve
the productivity of the manufacturer of the
corresponding final good. In contrast with Romer’s
model, in this model the new capital good takes the
place of the previous one, giving rise to a process of
“creative destruction”. It is understood that technical
progress creates profits but also losses, since
production processes, products, skills, markets and
areas of competitiveness are made obsolete, and it
may be that the losses outweigh the gains. Moreover
–also in contrast with Romer’s model, where innovation
takes place through incremental improvements– it is
understood that innovation takes place through
radical shocks in the economic systems.8
The third model to be considered is that of
Grossman and Helpman (1991, chap. 3), in which
technical progress takes place essentially through
expansion of the variety of goods produced. In an
innovative economy, knowledge (as measured by the
quantity of designs of different goods) increases with
time, increasing the productivity of the resources
used in research laboratories.9 Furthermore, a
substantial part of the knowledge accumulated in the
research and development (R&D) process can be
used by other agents at no cost to them. Within the
context of the model in question, this phenomenon
plays a central role in explaining sustained long-term
growth.
Each new product imperfectly replaces the
previous ones. It is also assumed that companies are
the only ones to possess the technology needed to
manufacture a unique differentiated product, thus
having monopoly power in the supply of that good.10
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6 For the purposes of this article, it is sufficient to consider the
models that incorporate monopolistic competition in the
analysis, since they are the same ones that see technical progress
as endogenous. We shall refer to this again later on. Among the
models which have been excluded from consideration are those
of Jones and Manuelli (1990) and Rebelo (1991), which
consider the accumulation of physical and human capital to be
the mainspring of growth, and the studies by Lucas (1988),
among others, in which the sustainability of growth is linked
with the accumulation of inputs that generate positive
externalities.
7 In other words, Romer introduces a simplifying assumption
that there is no obsolescence of capital goods.
8 It should be noted that in this model the time interval between
two innovations is a random variable, with the probability of
occurrence of an innovation depending on processes subject to a
Poisson-type distribution.
9 This assumes that there is a learning process in research
activities or in the practice of conducting research.
10 The authors in question also propose other models in which
technical progress is reflected in goods of better quality which
take the place of the previous ones, thus eliminating the
monopoly power of entrepreneurs manufacturing goods of
lower quality.
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Assuming a given quantity of resources, the model is
developed on the basis of a trade-off in the allocation
of those resources between R&D activities and the
manufacture of high-technology products. The rate
of innovation can be increased by allocating more
resources to R&D at the expense of manufacturing,
up to the point at which the opportunity costs of the
two activities become equal. When this point is
reached, the economy will attain a state of dynamic
equilibrium, with positive and constant rates of
innovation and growth and with a distribution of
resources between R&D and manufacturing which is
maintained over time.
It is important to note that, leaving aside their
special features, the three models considered can
give path-times for growth which may vary
according to the basic conditions of each economy
but which depend ultimately on the rate of technical
progress deriving from the manner of operation of
each economic system. This endogenization of
technical progress is closely related with the way
such progress is conceived, which is dealt with in the
following section. The possible paths also have
implications for the convergence or divergence
between economies, international trade and public
policies: matters which are dealt with in section 3
below.
2. Technology as an economic good, and its
implications
Endogenous growth models consider technological
knowledge as a non-pure public good, because of its
dual character of a non-rival and partially exclusible
good. Its non-rivality is associated with the
possibility of using it in one economic activity
without preventing or reducing its simultaneous use
in another. In other words, it is understood that
technological knowledge can be used by an
indeterminate number of firms for innumerable
periods of time, without depletion or additional
costs. The partially exclusible nature of a technology
means that its creator can only appropriate part of its
economic results. The other part consists of
externalities or technological spillover: i.e., the free
and automatic acquisition of knowledge created by
other enterprises. This spillover exists because
although a patent or secrecy prevent others from
making unauthorized use of new knowledge, this
exclusion is only temporary, and moreover there are
certain aspects of knowledge which are not
susceptible to exclusion.
In contrast with traditional growth theories, this
new conception of technology makes it possible to
construct models incorporating endogenous technical
progress and sustained growth of the per capita
product. These models incorporate, on the one hand,
a framework of monopolistic competition, in order to
justify private investment in R&D, and on the other
hand, the externalities that may be associated with
the creation of general technological knowledge,
which is the prime source of sustained growth. These
two aspects will be analysed in the following
sections.
a) Innovation and monopolistic competition
In order to explain how private enterprises that
generate technological knowledge behave, we must
abandon the usual assumption of the competitive
nature of markets and admit that their structure
takes on special features because of monopolistic
competition. The key to this reasoning is the partially
exclusible and non-rival nature of the technology.
In order for an entrepreneur to be willing to
innovate, he must be able to appropriate some of the
income associated with technological knowledge. If
the latter is non-exclusible, there will be no way to
effect such appropriation. If a good is partially
exclusible, however, a private generator of
technology can prevent others from using it freely for
a time, either through a patent or through secrecy.
This is what determines if an entrepreneur can obtain
a monopoly rent after innovation.
In traditional neoclassical models, the conditions
in which production activities are carried out in any
enterprise are represented by a homogeneous
production function with a degree of unity. With this
type of function, if the amount of resources is
doubled and exactly the same sequence of productive
actions are carried out, the amount produced will
also be doubled. In other words, there will be
constant returns to scale.11
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11 Formally, if Y = F(K,H,L) is a function of the type in
question, in which K, H and L represent respectively
physical capital, human capital and labour, then F(λK, λH, λL)
= λF(K, H, L).
ECLAC AND THE NEW GROWTH THEORIES • ADELA HOUNIE, LUCÍA PITTALUGA, GABRIEL PORCILE AND FABIO SCATOLIN
In the new neoclassical models, technological
knowledge becomes a non-rival factor of production.
As already noted, because of this it can be used again
and again without depletion or additional cost. A
production activity of this nature is represented by a
production function with increasing returns to scale.12
As the latter are expressed in a homogeneous
function with a degree greater than unity, this ensures
the existence of sufficient resources to remunerate
technological activities.13
In short, enterprises that generate technology
will not be able to survive unless they can receive
monopoly rents. The exclusibility of knowledge
–even if only partial– permits the appropriation of
this additional income associated with innovation,
while the non-rivality of technological knowledge is
reflected in production functions with increasing
returns to scale, so that firms can sell their products
at prices above the marginal production costs.
b) Technological externalities and growth
At the aggregate level of the economy as a
whole, the fundamental idea of the models analysed
here is that imperfect appropriation and non-rivality
make possible the wide dissemination of
technological knowledge. These technological
externalities give rise to sustained growth of per
capita GDP. Thus, in contrast with the traditional
models, in the new models such growth is an
endogenous result of the functioning of the economic
system.
The models in question distinguish between
specific and general knowledge, both derived from
the R&D carried out in private firms. Specific
knowledge permits a firm to manufacture a particular
product or incorporate a particular production
process. This is the type of knowledge which can be
temporarily protected by patents or secrecy, which
makes it an exclusible economic good. General
knowledge, in contrast, is of broader application and
is much more difficult to exclude, as it is much
harder to invoke universal principles and use the
existing legislation to legitimize the ownership of
this type of knowledge. The novel feature
incorporated by endogenous growth theory is,
precisely, that it recognizes the existence of
externalities in respect of general knowledge
resulting from private R&D efforts.
Such technological spillover gives rise, on the
one hand, to growing returns from the accumulation
of technological knowledge, and on the other to
increases in the productivity of rival factors of
production. With regard to the first of these effects, it
is shown that each researcher’s function of
production of knowledge helps to increase the
productivity of all the others, who will have these
discoveries at their disposal in the long run. The
externalities take place not only between
contemporaneous agents, but also over the course of
time. In other words, each innovation is an addition
to the stock of existing knowledge, which, moreover,
is not depleted. It can therefore be asserted that the
marginal product of research activity increases in
proportion as that stock grows.14
The second effect is connected with the capacity
of technological knowledge to act on each and every
one of the other inputs, so that the relation between
the amount of product obtained per unit of input is
greater when the latter is used in combination with
new knowledge. This effect makes it possible to
compensate for the tendency towards decreasing
marginal returns on accumulable factors such as
physical and human capital, thus resulting in
sustained growth of the per capita product.
3. The implications of the new theories
We will now analyse the way these models visualize
the relations between economies at different levels of
technological development and the ways in which
these relations affect the capacity to incorporate
technology and grow, as well as the role these
models assign to public policies.
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12 Formally, if F(A, R) represents a production function where
R denotes the rival inputs K, H and L and A denotes a non-rival
input, the non-rivality of the latter will mean that F(λA, λR) >
λF(A, R).
13 It should be recalled that, when constant returns to scale are
expressed as a homogeneous production function with a degree
of unity, payment to factors according to their respective levels
of marginal productivity depletes the exact value of the product
without taking away resources that could serve to remunerate
innovation.
14 Formally, this may be represented by the equation a = f(A),
where a is the amount of discoveries made by a researcher over
a certain period, A is the stock of available knowledge, and f is
a growing function. This representation may be made more
complex by introducing, for example, a random variable for the
length of duration of the research (Aghion and Howitt, 1992).
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a) Convergence or divergence?
Traditional neoclassical models predict what
they call “conditional convergence”. This expression
means that the per capita income growth rate of each
economy converges towards its own steady growth
value and also towards the per capita income levels
of the other economies. The word “conditional”
refers to the fact that this convergence also depends
on the different economies having certain similar
parameters, such as rates of saving, of capital
depreciation or of population growth.15
In contrast, by abandoning the hypothesis of
equality of technological opportunities between
countries or regions, the advocates of endogenous
growth theories find that it is not possible to predict
convergence on the basis of their models. The result
will depend on the effect of the spread of technology
on the growth of the various economies.
In the models of Grossman and Helpman
(1991), in principle the free spread of “general”
technological knowledge benefits both firms in the
country where the new knowledge is generated and
those in other countries too. However, the
international spread of the new knowledge takes
place with lags due to legal and cultural barriers that
inhibit the free circulation of persons and ideas
across national frontiers. The international or
national reach of this technological spillover and its
rate of spread will directly affect the possibilities of
economic convergence among nations.
“Specific” knowledge, for its part, can spread
through imitation. There will be entrepreneurs who
are interested in imitating a new product or process,
provided that the expected rent exceeds the costs by
a suitable margin, which will depend to a crucial
extent on the incidence of the patents system on
those costs.
The possibilities opened up by imitation have
analytical implications that affect North-South
relations regarding the dissemination of technology.
Thus, Grossman and Helpman (1991, chap. 11) have
prepared a specific model on this matter, in which it
is assumed that the South does not innovate itself but
imitates technologies generated in the North. Such
imitation is not exempt from costs, however: the
learning process needed to master new technologies
calls for efforts in the form of investments in
technological capacity. The spillovers generated by
these investments allow the South to accumulate a
stock of knowledge which grows with its experience
in imitation, which is associated with the amount of
technology copied from the North. The technological
lag of the South therefore has some positive aspects
in the form of the growth possibilities opened up by
the lower cost of imitative rather than innovative
R&D.16
International trade also affects the possibilities
of convergence among nations. For the purposes of
this article, cases of particular interest are those
where the production factor endowments differ, and
especially those where there are differences in the
endowments of skilled and unskilled labour, as
between North and South. In countries where there is
a relative shortage of the former and an abundance of
the latter, rapid opening up of foreign trade will tend
to induce specialization in activities using unskilled
labour, to the detriment of those making intensive
use of human capital, such as R&D. Furthermore, as
there is a lag in the spread of technological
spillovers, the researchers of countries with a small
knowledge base will find it difficult to compete with
those of countries better endowed in this respect. The
long-term growth rate of the first-named countries
could be increased by giving them time to catch up
with foreign technologies –and at the same time
improve their capacity for imitation and innovation–
before exposing them to unrestricted international
competition.
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15 For example, Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) have found
that the international disparity of per capita income levels and
growth rates is consistent with Solow’s standard model,
modified by the inclusion of human capital as an accumulable
factor and by the possibility that different countries may have
different rates of saving. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), for
their part, found that there was convergence of levels of per
capita income or product between the different states of the
United States (1880 to 1990), between 47 Japanese prefectures
(1930 to 1990) and between 90 regions of 11 European countries
(1950 to 1990).
16 It should not be assumed that the costs of such imitative R&D
are insignificant, however. Mansfield and others have estimated
that the cost of copying a new product or process is equal to
65% of the cost of the original innovation (cited by Grossman
and Helpman, 1991, p. 286).
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In short, endogenous growth models give rise to
development processes in which it is admitted that
there will not be convergence between the growth
rates of North and South because the initial
advantage of the Northern economies will tend to be
further reproduced, resulting in an ongoing
difference between their income levels and those of
the South. This tendency can be partially offset if the
efforts made by the latter make it possible to expand
the international reach of the technological
externalities generated in the North, if they are
capable of taking the fullest advantage of their
possibilities of imitation, and if they implement a
form of trade openness which does not undermine
the creation and full development of their domestic
technological capacity.
b) Public policies
The neoclassical formulations on the functioning
of competitive economies give rise to a generic
recommendation that State intervention should be
eliminated.17 The models we have just been discussing
here, however, give rise to recommendations in
favour of public intervention.
As noted by Grossman and Helpman (1994,
p. 37), in economies that grow on the basis of
innovation there are two types of obstacles that
hinder attainment of the standards of efficiency
usually associated with the free play of the market
forces. On the one hand, the existence of
monopolistic markets prevents the optimum
condition of “equimarginality” whereby the prices
of all the factors of production should be equal to the
respective levels of marginal productivity. On the
other hand, by not considering the effects of
technological externalities, private agents obtain
from their investments in technology –and, in more
general terms, from their accumulation efforts–
returns which are lower than the virtual social return
of alternative decisions.
Both these obstacles give grounds for assuming
that, in growth dynamics, it is possible to secure
improvements in levels of well-being through State
intervention. It is suggested that suitable public
policies for this purpose may be of various types,
depending on the origin and magnitude of the
externalities and the nature and degree of imperfect
competition. Clearly, however, emphasis is placed
on intervention mechanisms which correct the rates
of generation of technology to bring them closer to
their socially optimal levels and which also
disseminate the effects of the technological
externalities and reduce the discretionality of
monopolistic decisions regarding the qualities and
quantities of the goods produced.
The new models have specific and particularly
important repercussions on public policies typical of
less-developed countries. Thus, for example, Romer
(1993) holds that there is a technology gap between
the less developed countries and the more highly
developed nations.18 It may be concluded, from an
analysis of the dynamics of that gap, that in the more
backward countries public policies are of
fundamental importance for the creation of the
human capital needed in order to speed up growth.
The State has a central role to play in building the
necessary domestic base, by adapting the educational
system and institutional frameworks to make the
improvement of physical and human capital
profitable for private enterprise.
As a general appraisal, it may be said that the
new theories dealt with in this section treat technical
progress as an endogenous factor in the growth
process, while they consider such progress to be the
result of explicit and conscious decisions to invest in
technology.
The consequences of this change in attitude
are to be seen in various areas. As we already saw,
it is no longer reasonable to assume that there will
be convergence between the growth rates of
economies of different levels of development
regardless of the circumstances. Nor is it valid to
assert that the rapid and unrestricted opening of
international trade will have beneficial and
even-handed effects on all such economies, whatever
their level of development. Finally, the new theories
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17 Indeed, the growth models claim that if individuals focus on
distant horizons when defining their behaviour with regard to
saving and take into account the future situation of their
descendants, the long-term growth path of the economies will be
socially efficient provided that the State does not intervene.
18 In the study in question, Romer identifies two technology
gaps separating the industrialized nations from the less
developed countries: gaps in terms of “objects” and in terms of
“ideas”. The first of these refer to shortcomings in terms of
physical and human capital, while the latter refer to access to
the types of ideas which further the ongoing creation of new
goods and processes in the developed countries.
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contain a clear justification of public policies,
especially those having to do with the long-term
development of backward economies.
It must be borne in mind, however, that this
justification assumes that there will be continuing
full use of production resources over time, which
means that no account is taken of the possibility of
various kinds of imbalances and fluctuations. As we
shall see below (section IV), the models which are
termed “evolutionary models” have features which





Like the neoclassical endogenous growth models,
evolutionary models highlight the role of technical
progress in economic growth. They differ from them,
however, in the following aspects: i) generally
speaking, they emphasize the importance of the
institutional context in which technical progress is
generated and disseminated and the role of demand
in growth, combining Schumpeterian and Keynesian
variables, and ii) in the case of simulation models,
they assume decision-making processes based on
conventional heuristics or rules (limited rationality)
and allow for the incorporation of the sectoral
diversity of demand and technical progress.
In the evolutionary school, two types of models
may be identified. Both of them have their advan-
tages and disadvantages and may be considered com-
plementary to each other. On the one hand, there are
aggregate models, in which the decision-making pro-
cesses of firms are not specifically dealt with. Such
models make possible simple analysis of the influ-
ence of certain structural variables on growth. As-
suming the existence of an initial technology gap
between North and South, aggregate models seek to
determine in which cases the international dissemi-
nation of technology will give rise to processes of
convergence or divergence.
On the other hand, there are simulation models
in which the aggregate dynamics of the system are
identified through “artificial worlds” (Lane, 1993).
These consist of a varied set of agents endowed with
certain attributes, a certain environment, and a
dynamic which operates through selection and
learning mechanisms. These simulation models are
more theoretically exact, since they explicitly
identify the links between (microeconomic)
decision-making rules and (macroeconomic) growth
paths. They also have great flexibility for the
incorporation of technological diversity and the
contexts of competition and behaviour at the
microeconomic level. Their disadvantage is that the
complexity of the interactions may in some cases
obscure the roles played by each of the variables in
the system.19 This complexity makes it advisable to
use them in combination with simpler analytical
models, such as aggregate evolutionary models.
2. Aggregate evolutionary models
As well as taking into account the incidence of tech-
nical progress on the productivity of resources, as in
endogenist neoclassical models, aggregate evolution-
ary models also take account of its incidence on in-
ternational competitiveness, which conditions the
growth rate through effective demand. Thus, aggre-
gate models assume that the long-term growth rate of
a country will be that which is compatible with bal-
ance-of-payments equilibrium, which introduces a
Keynesian component into the model, associated
with the income elasticities of demand for exports
and imports, corrected by the availability of interna-
tional finance.20 These variables define the behaviour
of demand on domestic and external markets.
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19 This is, basically, the criticism that Romer makes of the
simulation models. See, in this respect, his comments on the
article by Dosi and Fabiani (1994), published together with that
article.
20 See McCombie and Thirlwall (1994, chap. 3). The
restrictions on demand are viewed in the context of an open
economy and expressed as balance-of-payments constraints.
This clearly coincides with some key issues dealt with in the
early ECLAC ideas.
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There are various types of aggregate
evolutionary models.21 Here, we shall refer to the
model by Verspagen (1993), because of its ability to
represent, in a simple manner, a broad range of
convergence and divergence paths (see Appendix 2).
Verspagen’s model suggests that in the countries of
the South, technical progress is, on the one hand, a
non-linear function of the initial level of the
technology gap. Up to a certain point, the existence
of such a gap favours technical progress in the South,
because it permits the imitation of existing
technologies. If the gap is very large, however
(greater than a certain critical value), the spread of
technology becomes more difficult, because the
capacity for imitation goes down with the distance
behind the technological frontier.
For a given initial level of the gap, the intensity
of imitation will depend on the existence of domestic
learning capacity, that is to say, the existence of a
domestic institutional base which makes it possible
to identify, adapt and improve the technology to be
imported. In the model in question, this base is
expressed through the parameter δ.22 If the intrinsic
learning capacity is very small, the international
dissemination of technology will be only feeble.
The technology gap also implies a gap in terms
of competitiveness between North and South. The
lower competitiveness of the South is reflected in
lower growth of demand and less incentive for
growth. The global incidence on growth will depend
on the direction and intensity of the competitiveness
effect and the technology dissemination effect.
Thus, the model in question plays down the
optimistic idea, implicit in most of the models based
on “catching up”, that the technology gap leads
automatically to the more rapid spread of technology.
Convergence is conditioned by the existence of
certain national institutional and technological
capacities. Moreover, even if the size of the gap
remains stable, this does not guarantee the
convergence of growth rates if there is still a
difference in the absolute levels of productivity (and
hence of competitiveness).23 Convergence would be
achieved only by speeding-up the autonomous
innovation process in the South.
It should be noted that the model assigns an
important role to public policies, which act by
changing the parameter δ. In this sense, Verspagen’s
model defines the field of action of public policies in
broader terms than Romer’s model, by incorporating
the whole range of institutions that influence the
technological learning process.
3. Simulation models
Simulation models make it possible to capture the
diversity of the microeconomic agents and the
sectoral diversity of technology and demand with a
high degree of detail. The model by Dosi and Fabiani
(1994) is an example which is relatively simple but
illustrates the potential of this type of analytical
construct for studying growth dynamics (see
Appendix 3).
This model assumes the existence of two
sectors, m firms and n countries. The decision-
making units are the firms, which decide how much
they will invest in innovation or imitation and what
price they will charge for their products, using
conventional rules of behaviour for this purpose. It is
considered that these rules more adequately reflect
the taking of decisions in conditions of uncertainty
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21 Among them are those by Amable (1994), Canuto (1995) and
Cimoli (1988). Each of these authors offers a model with some
distinctive features that make them members of a single family
tree whose main trunk is formed by aggregate models dealing
with North-South technological dynamics.
22 In principle, this parameter will depend on factors that affect
the capacity for the future absorption of technology or the
capacity for learning over time but are not reflected in the initial
technological level. Otherwise, they would already be taken into
account in the initial level of the technology gap. In highly
simplified terms, it could be held that two countries from the
South with similar levels of factor productivity will have the
same initial technology gap compared with the North. However,
if one of them has, for example, a system of support for
innovation or a credit programme to promote the dissemination
of new technologies, it will be able to import or disseminate the
technological advances made by the North more rapidly. The
initial gap is the same, but the parameter δ is different, because
the science and technology institutions are different.
23 As may be seen in Appendix 2, the absolute equilibrium
value of the gap G (at which the rate of increase of the gap is
zero) is positive, which means that the gap does not close
completely. For this equilibrium value of G, the difference
between the growth rates of the product in the North and in the
South will have a constant positive value (D > 0).
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than the maximization rules, which would not be
applicable to a context of limited rationality which
depends precisely on those conditions.24
Technical progress generates increases in
productivity in accordance with a stochastic process
that depends on investments in technology and the
technological opportunity of the sector. These
increases in productivity alter firms’ competitiveness25
and redefine their market shares. The dynamics of
the system can give rise to virtuous circles of growth
and competitiveness. Thus, as it is assumed that
investment in technology is a percentage of the
firm’s sales in the previous period, expanding firms
will also increase their investments in technology
and will therefore have greater probabilities of
innovating or imitating successfully in the following
period.
The intensity with which stragglers are
eliminated from the market (selection) or manage to
imitate the new technologies (learning) depends on
three classes of parameters: i) technological
parameters, which determine how far the innovation
effort changes the firms’ productivity (technological
opportunity)26 and the degree of difficulty of
imitation (appropriability of the innovation);27
ii) parameters of behaviour, which define to what
extent increases in productivity will be reflected in
lower prices and/or greater competitiveness, through
the application of a mark-up over costs, and iii)
parameters relating to the market structure or
competitive environment, which define the intensity
of the selection process for a given difference in
competitiveness.28 As a function of these parameters,
the model can give rise to a process of emulation –if
the imitation process (learning by the stragglers) is
faster than the selection process– or else to rapid
concentration of the market, if the opposite is the
case.
There are mechanisms which limit the intensity
of the selection and the tendency towards market
concentration, for given values of the parameters.
The model in question envisages the possibility of
adjustments in the exchange rate when the trade
balance runs up large deficits. It also incorporates a
wage adjustment mechanism whereby wages
increase more rapidly when the level of employment
rises. This means that countries that grow more
quickly will have larger wage increases, thus
favouring the competitiveness of the stragglers. At
the same time, the random nature of technical
progress means that past expansion does not
automatically result in higher productivity in the
future. The fact that innovation and imitation are
stochastic processes opens up additional possibilities
of change in industrial leadership, including
processes in which the leader is overtaken by firms
and countries that were stragglers (“forging ahead”).
Different growth paths can be generated by
changing the parameters (such as those regarding the
characteristics of the technology, the competitive
environment and the decision-making rules) or the
initial conditions of the model (such as the number
of firms and their characteristics, the type of sectoral
specialization and the distribution of markets). This
gives simulation models great flexibility for
reproducing different economic development
experiences. Such changes in the parameters and in
the definition of the initial conditions should
correspond with the available empirical information,
of course.
This potential for interacting with results taken
from economic history and from case studies is one
of the main virtues of simulation models. As noted
by Nelson (1994), traditional neoclassical theory
reached a “ceiling” in the 1960s, partly because of its
inability to absorb the wealth of information offered
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24 With regard to the problems of finding regularities of
behaviour in conditions of Knightian uncertainty, see Possas
(1988).
25 This occurs through changes in prices, assuming that these
are fixed by applying a mark-up over costs.
26 The greater the technological opportunity, the greater the
increases in productivity associated with successful innovation
and, hence, the greater the impact of the innovation on
competitiveness.
27 The greater the appropriability of an innovation, the slower
its imitation. The appropriability depends on the accumulativity
and tacit content of technical progress. Accumulativity exists
when the probability that a firm will find an innovation in the
period t+1 is a function of its distance from the technological
frontier in period t (for a given investment in R&D). The tacit
content of the innovation is the degree to which mastery of the
technique depends on the amount of experience in production
and the investment in technology, in contrast with learning
through manuals or other coded forms of dissemination.
28 For example, markets with a large number of marginal firms
will tend to have more intensive selection processes than those
in which only a few large firms are competing with each other.
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by historical and empirical research. Evolutionary
simulation models open up a doorway to the
knowledge accumulated in other areas, which
historians and economists can cross (in both
directions).29
At the same time, simulation models offer a
natural path for making aggregate growth models
increasingly precise. This does not mean that such
models should be replaced or abandoned,30 for the
simplicity of aggregate models allows them to be
used for the analysis of fundamental theoretical
problems which could remain unsolved because of
the complexity of simulation models. The latter,
however, do make it possible to deal comprehensively
with the non-linear aspects and imbalances which are
inherent in complex systems such as economic systems.
Finally, simulation models are particularly
appropriate for studying the effects of economic and
industrial policies. The greater realism of their
microeconomic assumptions and their great flexibility
give them advantages in this field compared with
aggregate models, whether conventional or
evolutionary.
Evolutionary models have brought out both the
importance of the role of development policies for
inducing the sustained growth of lagging economies
and the fact that the technological effort made by
such economies is the key to international
convergence or divergence. In the light of these
models, the role of development policies is seen to
be both broad and complex: they must stimulate the
spread of technology, and not merely the attainment
of higher rates of accumulation of physical capital,
which is seen primarily as a vehicle for the learning
process. The construction of institutions in the field
of science and technology becomes important in
view of the massive transfer of resources between
sectors. This does not mean that the type of sectoral
specialization is irrelevant. Any horizontal policy for
stimulating the dissemination of technology has
important sectoral consequences, since it favours
some activities more than others and thus redefines
the growth path. By giving priority to science and
technology policy, the evolutionary models suggest
that the desired structural change should be sought
more through indirect dissemination methods than
through direct subsidies for accumulation in certain
sectors.
Indeed, an interesting line of future research
would be to use simulation models to study the dif-
ferent growth paths that could be generated on the
basis of various different sectoral structures and dif-
ferent assumptions regarding technology and demand
in the initial period.
V
The new ECLAC
1. ECLAC and the new growth theories
Since the mid-1980s, ECLAC has been incorporating
the results of the new growth theories mentioned
above into its approaches. This permeability of
ECLAC thinking is due, as already noted, to the fact
that the core of its original contributions already
contained concepts which have now reappeared and
are being highlighted in these theories. Moreover,
many empirical studies carried out in ECLAC and,
above all, the efforts to renew their interpretation and
the proposals put forward by that institution in the
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29 Quite an obvious direction for the construction of new
simulation models is a systematic analysis of sectoral diversity,
which is given relatively little attention in the two-sector model
by Dosi and Fabiani. Another direction is the incorporation of
the specific features of labour markets in the North and the
South. A differential aspect which is as yet under-analysed is the
heterogeneity of those markets in the economies of the South,
where underemployment (that is to say, employment at very low
levels of productivity) affects a very high percentage of the total
economically active population.
30 It is generally recognized that the whole question of the
validity of aggregate models whose microeconomic bases are
not explicitly stated is extremely complex. Such models are
often criticised on the grounds that their microeconomic bases
are obtained by extreme reduction of the variety of agents to a
single “representative agent” (Vercelli, 1991, p. 235).
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1980s are basically consistent with evolutionary
theories.31 It should also be borne in mind that the
basic subject of ECLAC’s studies –the Latin
American economies– implies a recurrent challenge
to conventional theories, both because of the special
features of these economies and the problems which
beset them in the 1980s.
The big changes taking place in the international
setting (the technological revolution, globalization)
call for the reinterpretation of the problems of Latin
American development and the reformulation of
proposals for overcoming them. The analyses made
in recent years are not as consistent in content or
form as those made by ECLAC in its first decades of
activity, but this may be attributed at least in part to
the level of complexity of the phenomena that must
be dealt with now, or, if one prefers, to the depth and
speed of the changes. To a certain extent, the efforts
of the “new ECLAC” may be seen as an attempt to
apply the more recent growth theories to the study of
Latin America, with emphasis on the policy
implications of those theories in the structural and
institutional context of the countries of the region. As
we shall see in due course, these implications are
directly related to the importance assumed by
technological dynamics, increasing yields and
externalities in the new theories.32
2. Competitiveness and growth
The starting point for the arguments of the new
ECLAC is the importance of competitiveness for
sustained long-term growth. The “genuine”
competitiveness of an economy is understood as “the
capacity to increase (or at least maintain) its
international market share while at the same time
raising the standard of living of the population”.33
This capacity depends on the incorporation of
technological progress, as reflected in the ongoing
introduction of new processes and the production of
new goods and services. In the long term, in order to
increase the competitiveness of an economy it is
necessary to reduce the distance separating it from
international best practices (or at least prevent this
distance from increasing). At the microeconomic
level, this means attaining the standards of efficiency
prevailing in the rest of the world with regard to
resource use and the quality of the products or
services offered, which in turn implies the
identification, imitation and adaptation of new
production functions by enterprises (ECLAC, 1990).
With the intensification of international
competition and the development of information
technology, the incorporation of technical progress
becomes a salient feature in the production of a wide
range of goods and services. Consequently, in order
to win a successful place in the world economy there
must be ongoing efforts to improve the efficiency
with which production resources are used, to
incorporate intellectual added value into the goods
and services produced, and to keep on raising the
skills of the population so as to increase its capacity
to participate in the processes of innovation and the
dissemination of technology. These conditions are
directly related with the type of production
specialization followed by the region, which is
related in turn with the behaviour of demand and
technical progress in the different sectors of the
economy (ECLAC, 1990).
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31 Indeed, in his study La industrialización trunca de América
Latina Fajnzylber (1983) anticipates the general ideas of the
new evolutionism. This and other later works by Fajnzylber are
undoubtedly landmarks in this renovation. Among them, special
mention may be made of “International competitiveness: agreed
goal, hard task” published in CEPAL Review (Fajnzylber, 1988)
and Industrialization in Latin America: from the “black box” to
the “empty box” which appeared in the “Cuadernos de la
CEPAL” series (Fajnzylber, 1990).
32 Everything indicates that in the effort that culminated in the
late 1980s with the document “Changing production patterns
with social equity” (ECLAC, 1990), the influence of
evolutionary ideas was predominant. Since then, ideas from the
endogenous growth theories (ECLAC, 1992, 1995 and 1996)
have been gradually incorporated as these theories develop.
33 ECLAC, 1990, p. 68. Genuine competitiveness is seen to be
different from the type of competitiveness deriving from
short-term or “spurious” factors, such as an undervalued
exchange rate or low wages. This definition is in line with the
term “structural competitiveness” proposed by the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Quite
apart from its implications in terms of successful enterprise
management, the latter term reflects the strength and efficiency
of the national production structure, the long-term trends of the
rate and structure of investment, the technical infrastructure, and
other factors determining the externalities providing support for
the activities of enterprises (OECD, 1992, p. 243). Likewise,
both these definitions are similar to that used in the 1985 report
of the Presidential Committee on the competitiveness of United
States industry, according to which a nation’s competitiveness
reflects its capacity to respond to international market
challenges, while at the same time increasing the real income of
its citizens.
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As we have seen, the growth of trade in
manufactures is greater than the growth of world
trade as a whole, especially in the branches where
technological innovation is most intense.34 This
suggests that the only sustainable way of penetrating
international markets is to add knowledge to the
goods and services exported. It is also asserted that
the polarization between primary commodities and
industrial products has lost significance. Nowadays,
the most important thing is to produce goods
involving the intensive use of knowledge and
technology, along with the creation of export-
oriented production and services networks (ECLAC,
1990, p. 84). In other words, rapid export-driven
growth calls for the diversification of goods and
markets in the direction of the most dynamic
products, which are generally those with the greatest
technological content and value added.
In the difficult transitional period of the 1990s,
in spite of their limited demand elasticities exports
based on the processing of natural resources may
become a means of progressing to the export of
manufactures of higher technological content,
provided that they give rise to an “export mentality”
which becomes firmly rooted in the systems of
production, transport, marketing and finance (ECLAC,
1990). However, the key to long-term growth of
productivity and the product lies in a successful
effort to improve the export structure.
It is clear that this proposal is more than a mere
hypothesis. Thus, ECLAC notes that “There is a
distinct process at work which is establishing a new
pattern of international specialization. As a result,
the region’s countries appear to be increasingly
dedicated to highly standardized industrial products
over whose international prices they have no decisive
say, since these products are traded in highly
competitive markets. From this standpoint, the
productive system is adapting to a new set of relative
prices that are closer to the opportunity cost or
international price of the resources; at the same time,
however, the main sectors of activity have become
technologically less complex than during the
import-substitution phase or have lost the capacity to
stimulate technology assimilation processes in other
sectors” (ECLAC, 1996, p. 39).
The foregoing considerations bring us to a
central aspect of the arguments of the new ECLAC. In
recent years, the economies of the region have
passed through a rapid process of increasing external
openness, which is seen as a positive factor from the
point of view of competitiveness and in comparison
with the inefficiencies associated with the indis-
criminate protection applied in previous periods.
At the same time, however, it is understood that, if
used as an exclusive policy instrument, such open-
ness can heighten the less dynamic type of special-
ization currently observed. In order for there to be a
“virtuous” form of insertion in international trade,
pro-active (mesoeconomic and microeconomic) policies
are needed that will make it possible to correct the
flaws in the technology and human capital markets,
as well as in the oligopolistic markets for products
subject to increasing returns. At the same time, if
these increasing returns are associated in many
sectors with economies outside the firm, the price
mechanism will not be capable of adequately reflect-
ing the social yield of the production and of the in-
vestments made in it (ECLAC, 1996). This is a further
justification for adopting deliberate policies in the
areas of trade, production and technology, or, in more
general terms, development policies which promote
changing production patterns in the economies of the
region, with a view to the attainment of genuine com-
petitiveness.
3. Competitiveness and the national innovation
system
In this field, the new ECLAC shows significant
advances, since it directly addresses the area of the
interactions of public and private agents and their
role in innovation and the dissemination of
technology. ECLAC maintains that each country,
region or enterprise has a specific context which
causes the agents to react differently to a given
signal. This context includes i) the technological
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34 In the period 1962-1985, “the growth rate of exports of
primary commodities (1.6%) was less than that of natural-
resource-based manufactures (mainly processed foodstuffs),
which grew at the rate of 3.7%. Traditional non-natural-
resource-based manufactures, for their part (mainly
labour-intensive consumer goods), grew at the rate of 6.8%,
while the highest growth rate, 8.1%, was registered by the new
manufactures heavily reliant on research and development
(microelectronics, telematics, biotechnology, genetic engineering
and new materials).” (ECLAC, 1990, p. 41).
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opportunities and obstacles;35 ii) the experience and
skills acquired by individuals and organizations;
iii) the capabilities and experience that flow from
one economic activity to another; iv) the institutional
environment, determined by the combination of
public and private mechanisms and institutions and
the existence of major processes of “institutional
innovation” (understood as the capacity to adapt and
transform the institutional schemes on which the
capacity for innovation is based), and v) conditions
of mutual interaction between the creators of
technological innovations and their users, which can
be of crucial importance for either stimulating or
inhibiting enterprises’ capacity for learning and
adaptation (ECLAC, 1990).
These conditions come under what is called the
national innovation system, which is defined as the
set of agents, institutions and rules of behaviour that
determine the rate of importation, generation,
adaptation and dissemination of technological
knowledge in all the sectors of the economy,
including human resources training activities and
their financing (ECLAC, 1996). The characteristics of
the national innovation system are determined by the
degree of scientific and technological maturity,36 the
system of macroeconomic incentives, the regulatory
framework, and the business, legal and regulatory
“culture”.
The importance assigned to the national
innovation system reflects the view that the
consolidation and expansion of this system –or, if
preferred, the increase in innovation capacity that
this implies– is the key element in development
policy and/or policies for changing production
patterns.
4. The question of equity (technology,
competitiveness and equity)
The links between technology, competitiveness and
equity occupy a particularly important place in the
proposals of the new ECLAC. Lower wages are often
perceived as a variable that favours competitiveness,
but in the ideas of the new ECLAC the concept of
competitiveness incorporates technical progress and
also equity. Moreover, it is suggested that greater
equity favours the spread of technology, since it gives
rise to a more favourable framework for the efforts to
further inter-firm cooperation required by the new
technologies. At the same time, this includes elements
of a virtuous circle, as increases in productivity would
permit a gradual improvement in income distribution.
The relation between the domestic market and
competitiveness also takes on new dimensions
(ECLAC, 1990); it is perceived that expansion of the
national and regional domestic market deriving from
growth with equity provides an irreplaceable base for
tecnological learning. The arguments in this respect
note that in the cases where there has been feedback
between competitiveness and equity the following
phenomena have been observed: i) a change in
agriculture towards more homogeneous agrarian
structures, with rises in productivity; ii) more
equitable access to property, through the creation of
small and medium-sized enterprises tied into the
production system and registering growing levels of
productivity; iii) upgrading of labour skills, universal
access to education and a higher degree of social
integration; iv) growth in employment, linked with
export growth; v) increases in productivity and
wages; vi) the spread of an industrial rationale, and
vii) income redistribution through the public finances.
As may be gathered from this, the new ECLAC
holds that the expansion of the economies of Latin
America depends on the attainment of genuine com-
petitiveness, based on the ongoing generation and in-
corporation of technical progress, which are likewise
necessary for sustaining an outward-looking
growth pattern. In order to achieve this sustainability,
production and technology policies of various types
and scopes are needed, among which special mention
may be made of those designed to consolidate and
expand the national innovation system. It is also
perceived that the success of these policies cannot
be divorced from the gradual improvement of
distributional equity, both because of its effects on
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35 As already noted (see footnote 26), the greater the
technological opportunity, the greater will be the increase in
competitiveness associated with a successful innovation. In
turn, the technological opportunities are determined by the
prevailing technological paradigm, so that the appearance of
new paradigms leads to their reformulation, both as regards
their scope and their ease of materialization. The sectoral
distribution of such opportunities depends on the nature of the
activities, the technological distance from the “revolutionary
core”, and the knowledge base (Dosi, 1988).
36 The greater the maturity of the technology (standardization
and slow rate of change), the less costly it is to transmit the
relevant information over longer distances (both geographical
and cultural). On the other hand, when the technology is
changing rapidly and radically, geographical and cultural
proximity is more important (ECLAC, 1990).
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the dimensions of the domestic market and its indi-
rect effects on the growth of innovative capacity.
The brief summary given in the previous
paragraph highlights the links between the new
ECLAC proposals and the most recent endogenist
and evolutionary models. Essentially, the analytical
effort of the endogenist models is focussed on the
treatment of technical progress as an endogenous
variable. That effort is also aimed at outlining the
policies required in order to avoid increasing
divergence or even to achieve a process of
international convergence.
VI
Comparison of the most recent growth
models with the ECLAC approach
In the previous pages, we described some recently
formulated growth models which are also useful for
the analysis of North-South relations and we outlined
some approaches to these matters developed in Latin
America, especially in ECLAC and its academic
circles. In this section, we will review and compare
some key aspects of these approaches and those
models.
The first item that strikes us is the importance
assigned by the most recent growth models to
technological knowledge as an economic growth
factor and their general agreement on the important
role of the technical progress of each country as the
main source of international differences, reflected in
the divergences between long-term growth rates. The
new models thus bring up once again an aspect
which was of central importance in the conception of
the centre-periphery system formulated by ECLAC in
its early years, which attributed the bipolar nature of
economic development to the slow and uneven
spread of technical progress through the international
economy.
It should be borne in mind that in the late 1940s
there were no theoretical schemes permitting a
systematic analysis of the links between technology
and growth. These links were only incorporated into
formal economic models after a long and complex
process which only began to show marked advances
as from the mid-1980s. Since then, substantial
differences have begun to be observed in the
conception of technical change.
Whereas the original ECLAC approach may be
interpreted as being connected with what we now
call the “metal products and machinery-based
technological paradigm”, both the new theories and
the recent documents of ECLAC have arisen in a
period of “technological revolution” in which a new
paradigm is assuming increasing prominence: that
based on information technology. Under the previous
paradigm, technology was seen mainly as being
incorporated in capital goods and was reflected in
changes in processes and products and, ultimately, in
particular sectors of activity. Similarly, technical
progress was seen as being exogenous to production
activities and enterprises, as well as to the economic
systems of the periphery.
The extraordinary speeding-up of technical
change in the last fifteen years and the great capacity
for the spread of information technology to an
ever-growing range of goods and services have
formed a context in which the technology factor can
hardly continue to be viewed as exogenous. This,
together with the evolution of the theories themselves,
has formed the basis for a profound change in the
manner of visualizing technical progress.
In the neoclassical tradition, emphasis is now
placed on technology’s character of a non-pure public
good. Innovations are generated by enterprises in a
system of monopolistic competition which permits
the partial appropriation of their benefits by those
enterprises. At the same time, the technical progress
that they do not appropriate generates technological
externalities which become a key element for
explaining economic growth.
In the evolutionary approach, emphasis is placed
on the tacit and accumulative nature of technological
knowledge, which makes the processes of
generation, imitation, adaptation and dissemination
more complex, a fundamental factor being the
surrounding institutional environment. Technical
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progress determines the competitiveness of products,
enterprises and economies, conditioning the long-term
growth rate through the demand for the various
goods, in an increasingly interdependent world. This
explains both the sectoral technological diversity and
the international differences in per capita income
growth rates.
The ECLAC of the 1990s basically has a systemic
conception of technical progress. Indeed, the devel-
opment of a national innovation system forms one of
the central proposals of ECLAC neostructuralism37
and represents the hub of technological and
production policies because of its influence on the
development of local learning capability. This base
of a markedly evolutionary nature is accompanied by
arguments deriving from endogenous growth
theories: the technology market has flaws due to the
fact that technical knowledge and information is a
non-pure public good, and these flaws lead to
under-investment in technological matters and justify
direct State intervention through mesoeconomic or
“horizontal” policies.
A second aspect which needs to be compared is
that of the attitudes to sectoral development policies
(also known as “horizontal” policies). These attitudes
derive from the different conceptions of technology.
In the traditional ECLAC approach the sectors were
clearly defined. It was considered that industrial
development should be supported, especially in the
case of those activities where the productivity of
capital was closer to that of the centres, by
establishing a system of protective tariffs, with
decreasing levels of protection, to make up for the
disadvantages inherited from the past. It was also
considered that, in order to offset the tendency to an
external imbalance inherent in the industrialization
of peripheral-type economies, it was necessary to
undertake the production of goods at different stages
in the industrial chain.38 Likewise, in view of the
requirements of some of these goods in terms of
production scales, it was also considered that the
industrialization effort should be carried out in
economic spaces of a suitable size, which could be
achieved more easily through regional integration.
In the new models and approaches, the above
sectoral approach has become less clearly defined. It
is not that production specialization has lost
importance –there is a general view that greater
international division of labour is a positive factor for
trade– but there is general agreement on the growing
difficulty of picking “winners” and “losers” in
advance at a time of intensive changes in
technologies and markets.39 Although it is
acknowledged that technical progress may be
concentrated in specific areas or branches of science
and technology, there is no clear advance knowledge
of the sectors of production which are going to
expand most because they are “technology vectors”
or make intensive use of knowledge. Thus, for
example, while giving priority to science and
technology policy, the evolutionary models suggest
that the desirable structural changes should be sought
mainly through indirect (or horizontal) means rather
than through massive transfers of resources between
sectors.
Much of the difficulty of forecasting “winning”
sectors is undoubtedly connected with the fact that
the new technologies make intensive use of knowledge,
but the latter is highly dynamic. The Latin American
debate on development policies is also influenced,
however, by some attitudes which are closer to the
ideas of unbridled liberalization than to the analytical
bases of the new growth theories. These attitudes
range from negation of the sectoral perspective and
even of industrial development policy itself to an
extreme position which questions both the deliberate
promotion of industrialization (which ECLAC advocated
up to the late 1980s) and the industrialization in
closed markets which was actually taking place and
whose inefficiency is rather unfairly blamed on
ECLAC. The implicit assumption of these attitudes is
of course that the market optimizes resource
allocation without any need for State intervention to
guide and stimulate economic development, even in
the case of the peripheral countries.
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37 Making it different from other proposed processes of change
for the region, such as those of the World Bank.
38 Simple consumer goods, complex consumer goods,
intermediate inputs, widely used intermediate inputs, and
capital goods.
39 Krugman (1992b) might be an exception in this respect. In the
search for criteria on which to base a selective sectoral policy,
and in the light of the concepts of pecuniary external savings
and strategic complementarities, he proposes that geographical
clusters of enterprises should be identified, that their causes
should be investigated, and that an evaluation should be made of
whether the externalities are substantial enough to warrant
government support.
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In short, although the models and approaches
analysed agree on the desirability of public policies
to further the incorporation of technology and
promote growth with a view to fostering international
convergence, there has been a significant change in
the method proposed: instead of the traditional
policies of supporting specific sectors of production,
it is now proposed that there should be policies to
correct, complete or promote factor markets
–especially those for human capital (educational
policies) and technology (science, technology and
innovation policies)– as well as to address other
institutional aspects that determine the environment
in which enterprises operate.
The third point of comparison which is worthy
of note concerns the concepts of bipolarity and of the
international divergence of long-term per capita
income growth rates. The endogenist models recognize
the possibility that the initial advantage of the
economies of the North tends to be reproduced,
resulting in an ongoing difference between their
income levels and those of the countries of the
South. This tendency could be checked if the efforts
of the latter were concentrated on absorbing the
technological externalities generated in the North
and taking the fullest possible advantage of the
possibilities for imitation, by adopting a form of
trade openness which is compatible with the creation
and maturity of their domestic technological capabilities.
The evolutionary models, for their part, represent a
wide range of possible growth paths, although those
that take into account conditions of backwardness
typical of less developed economies give results that
indicate a widening of the income gap. The
convergence paths are conditional upon the existence
of national institutional and technological capacities.
The truth is that if there is to be progress towards
comparable levels of per capita product among
countries it is indispensable that the autonomous
innovation process in the South should be speeded up.
In the first stage of ECLAC’s analytical studies,
bipolarity was the main analytical way of expressing
the problems of the periphery, which was seen as an
anomaly in comparison with a paradigm of smooth
and harmonious functioning of the international
economy on the basis of a division of labour provid-
ing for the joint industrialization of both poles of the
system. The concept of bipolarity means that the
spontaneous relations between the two poles are not
such as to generate this joint industrialization but in-
stead perpetuate the structural differences: heteroge-
neity and specialization of the periphery, on the one
hand, and homogeneity and diversification of the
centres on the other. This differentiation is the under-
lying element in the unequal evolution of the levels
of per capita product.
At the time, bipolarity emerged as an alternative
concept to that of static comparative advantages,
which advocated the optimization of international
resource allocation through unrestricted free trade. In
terms of the modern debate on convergence, the
initial ECLAC attitude stressed that if the periphery
did not industrialize –in other words, if it did not
incorporate technical progress– there would be
international divergence of income levels between one
pole and the other. As already noted, subsequently
emphasis was also placed on the need –likewise
subject to economistic criteria– to develop those
branches where peripheral industrialization could
not make a start because of its initial specialization:
consumer durables, widely-used inputs, and above all
capital goods.
The ECLAC approach in the 1990s is the opposite
to that which claims that liberalization itself
automatically produces convergence. Although there
is no clear reformulation of the bipolarity hypothesis
in its recent documents, the present ECLAC attitude
could be classed with that termed “conditional
convergence”. It suggests that the gradual reduction
of differences in income between the countries of the
region and the developed countries, with parallel
absorption of the increase in the economically active
population, would be obtained by attaining a given
rate of growth of per capita income, which in turn
means a certain rate of increase of the product and a
high investment coefficient.40 In order to realize this
possibility of convergence it is necessary to adopt a
set of policies focussed on the construction and
development of a national innovation system.
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“Rapid and sustained growth for the Latin American and
Caribbean countries, which will represent a gradual decrease in
income disparities in relation to the developed countries, will
clearly improve the region’s traditional performance. Absorbing
the increase in the active population will mean a systematic rise
in real per capita incomes at a rate of 4% per annum, with
relatively minor fluctuations from one year to the next. In order
to achieve these goals, the countries must expand their gross
domestic product at rates of nearly 6% per year. ….. such a
performance will require an investment of around 28% of
regional GDP, which means a 7% increase in the current average
ratio ….” (ECLAC, 1996, p. 51).
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VII
Final remarks
The foregoing review of some of the main recent
growth models, and their comparison with the views
of ECLAC, was designed to bring out their analytical
similarities or divergences and to identify the
different theoretical bases on which they were
constructed. Prime emphasis was placed on the
convergence of their views on the role of technical
progress as the main source of the differences
between countries, as reflected in the divergences
between their long-term growth rates.
This review also revealed another type of
convergence which is worth noting in these final
remarks: in the light of all the models and approaches
reviewed, it is clear that there is significantly more
scope for the application of policies to promote
growth. It was not possible, however, to analyse in
depth the various theoretical grounds justifying State
intervention.
In the endogenous growth models, this greater
scope stems from the consideration of new “market
flaws” connected with monopoly situations (necessary
in order to provide incentives for investment in
innovation) and with various types of externalities
(necessary for the long-term continuity of economic
growth). Both the monopoly situations and the
externalities generate non-optimal Paretian equilibria.
Development policies could aim to correct these
flaws, resulting in higher growth rates. The existence
of such flaws is not new, but what is new is the
recognition of their importance for long-term
economic performance.
The evolutionary models, for their part, by
incorporating institutional aspects, bring out the fact
that the new public policies are necessarily more
complex than in the past, so that veritable
“institutional engineering” is needed to provide the
coordination mechanisms that are missing in a free
market economy. Development policy becomes a
means of creating conditions of competitiveness in
the economic system by coordinating the institutions
with the strategies followed by enterprises in order
to promote technological learning. In turn, this
coordination must incorporate more general
measures to ensure an efficient infrastructure,
adequate scientific and technological resources,
human resources training, and other aspects.
Thus, the new models reduce the validity of the
arguments that largely blame government
intervention for the relative failures of certain
countries in terms of growth and participation in the
international economy. However, they do not appear
to incorporate in their bases, at least explicitly, two
aspects which are typical of economies that, like
those of Latin America, suffer from certain types of
backwardness: on the one hand, backwardness in the
diversification and linking-up of their structures of
production, where there is little development of the
technologically most complex activities, and on the
other, backwardness in their existing levels of
accumulation, which are indispensable for investment
and economic growth. These disadvantages take on even
more serious dimensions in a globalized economy
where States have less and less independence in the
management of their economic policies.
An aspect which will probably continue to occupy
a leading place among policy concerns is the level of
employment, which appears as a mere “residual” in the
models studied: the greater the absorption of technical
progress and the degree of capital accumulation, the
smaller this residual value. Such an attitude is undoubt-
edly over-optimistic, however, in the case of economies
like those of Latin America which display high degrees
of structural heterogeneity: i.e., they still have signifi-
cant contingents of workers employed in
low-productivity activities.
Furthermore, in the 1990s many of these
economies are in the midst of intensive restructuring
processes. The transition between different production
structures can give rise, even when it is taking place
in the direction that is most desirable in the long
term, to long periods of high unemployment, which
not only has social costs but also involves a
significant loss of growth potential of the product. It
is therefore necessary to make a greater effort to
construct models that take account of this specific
aspect of the Latin American economies and make a
more realistic evaluation of the impact of
development policies on employment levels.
(Original: Spanish)
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APPENDIX 1
Romer’s model
The model by Romer (1990) recognizes four production factors: i) technology (A), defined as a stock of knowledge, assimi-
lable in turn to the quantity of designs of capital goods available; ii) capital (K), equivalent to the sum of a set of production
goods which are differentiated and hence not perfectly interchangeable; iii) labour (L), made up of unskilled labour, the sup-
ply of which is assumed to be constant, and iv) human capital (H), resulting from the cumulative effect of activities such as
formal education and on-the-job training. The total amount of human capital is used in the production of a final good (HY)
and in research (HA): H = HY + HA. It is assumed that the stock of human capital remains constant.
These inputs are used in three sectors: i) the research sector, which produces new knowledge (for example, designs for
new capital goods) on the basis of human capital (HA) and the existing stock of knowledge (A); ii) the capital goods sector,
which uses the designs developed in the research sector to manufacture the capital goods to be used in the final goods sector,
and iii) the final goods sector, which uses labour (L), human capital (HY) and the differentiated capital goods to generate the
final product.
The research sector operates in the following manner: if a researcher j has a certain quantity of human capital Hj and
has access to a portion Aj of the total stock of knowledge incorporated in previous designs, his output of new designs will be
δ.Hj.Aj (where δ is a productivity parameter common to all researchers).
The model assumes that all those carrying out research have free access to the total stock of knowledge. This is the
same as assuming that knowledge is a non-rival good and, ultimately, that all researchers can make use of A at the same
time. The output of researcher j will therefore not be the amount shown in the previous paragraph, but will instead be δ.Hj.A.
Adding together the output of all the researchers, we obtain the following equation:
Ä = δ.HA.A (1)
In this expression it is implicitly assumed that every additional unit of human capital included in the research increases
the growth rate of technology, and not just its level. Every new design is added to the existing stock of knowledge, and
furthermore this stock is never depleted. Consequently, the marginal product of the researchers grows in line with the growth
of A. In other words, a researcher working at the present time and having the same human capital as another researcher a
century ago (measured in terms of years of education) will have higher productivity than his predecessor because he will be
able to take advantage of all the new knowledge accumulated over that period.
It is understood that this externality, which is a specific feature of the generation of knowledge, is produced not only
over time but also between contemporary agents. In other words, it is at once inter-temporal and inter-agents. If the marginal
product of HA were decreasing in line with the accumulation of designs, the lack of opportunities in the research sector
would eventually cause the human capital to be used in the final goods sector, thus reducing the output of technology.
The sector producing capital goods cannot be characterized by a single representative enterprise because it is assumed
that there is a different enterprise for each durable good i. Each enterprise acquires the design of capital good i in the
research sector and obtains a patent of unlimited duration. The owner of the design has exclusive property rights over it for
the production of capital goods, but not for its use in research, so that designs may be characterized not only as non-rival
goods but also as partially exclusible goods.




where xi is the quantity available of capital good i (1≤i ≤A).
In this sector there are increasing returns in the production of machinery and equipment because of the non-rival nature
of the design, for the use of a design in the production of capital goods has a marginal cost close to zero. Because of this, the
capital goods market has a monopolistic structure.
Capital goods are produced with the same technology as consumer goods, using the resources not used for
consumption (C): ∆K = Y - C.
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This function is assumed to be first-degree homogeneous, and it is also accepted that the product of this sector can be
described in terms of the activities of a single price-taking representative enterprise. It is observed that the level of
production of the final goods will depend not only on the quantity of labour and human capital but also on the level and
diversity of the goods making up the capital aggregate.
The competitive nature and efficiency of the markets in the final goods sector will mean that x1 = ... = xA = x, so that
Σi=1
A
xi = A.x = K.




which is transformed into:
Y = (A.HY)α.(A.L)β.(A.x) 1-α-β (3’’)
Equation (3’’) reveals, through the explicit introduction of the non-rival input A, the mechanism whereby technical
progress affects the volume of production. Thus, it is observed that an increase in the stock of capital goods (an increase in
K) will have different results on the volume of production, depending on whether that increase merely consists of the use of
more existing machines (an increase in x) or whether it involves the creation of new types of machines (an increase in A). In
the latter case, the effect will be greater because in addition to the increase in the stock of capital there will be the effect of
the technical progress incorporated in the new machines, reflected in the improvement in the efficiency of human capital and
labour.41
The model in question defines an equilibrium growth rate whose level depends crucially on the allocation of human
capital between research and production activities and on the allocation of the final product between consumption and
investment.
This growth rate is determined by the expression:
g = δ.HA = δ.H - Λρ
Λ.σ + 1 (4)
In this expression Λ = α / (1-α-β)(α+β) and the intertemporal optimization condition of a consumer with an infinite
horizon (along the lines of Ramsey’s model)42 is defined as ∆C/C = (r-ρ)/σ, where ρ is the intertemporal preference rate, r is
the interest rate and 1/σ (considered to be constant) is the intertemporal substitution elasticity between the amounts of con-
sumption at different times. Through this ratio, consumer preferences thus have an influence on the growth rates of the
model.
It may be noted that the greater the stock of human capital, the higher these growth rates will be. This is therefore the
variable whose scale is most significant in the model, since it is the key input in the research sector. It may be inferred from
this that the size of an economy is of particular importance, since it is the total amount of human capital (and not just its
average level) which is the virtual determinant of its growth rate.
41 This is reflected in increasing returns to scale which are not
internalized by any individual producer of final goods. They are
returns which are perceived at the aggregate level of all
producers, since they derive from externalities which exist in
the economy.
42 It may be recalled that Ramsey (1928) introduced into a
neoclassical model the assumption that families select their
consumption path through the maximization of a utility function
subject to a budgetary restriction: that is to say, they adopt an
optimal form of behaviour.
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APPENDIX 2
Verspagen’s model
Verspagen’s model assumes that technology acts on economic growth both directly and indirectly (Verspagen, 1993,
p. 127). The direct effect is associated with the increase in the technological knowledge base that can be used by firms. The
indirect effect is associated with the increase in exports, seen as a substitute variable for the increase in demand. Formally:
yi = α.ti + ε.xi i = s,n (1)
where yi is the proportional rate of growth of the product, ti is the rate of increase of technological capabilities and xi is the
growth rate of the exports of country i. Equation (1) shows that the growth rate of country i (in this case, i can be a country
of the North or of the South) will be a function of the rate of technical change and of export growth.
The export growth rate of each country is a function of its relative technological level –which reflects its international














) + z (3)
If Tn > Ts, then L(Tn/Ts) = G (the technology gap) will be a positive number, which means that the exports of the North
will grow faster than the international economy.
The rate of technical progress in the North, tn, is a function of its autonomous rate of innovation (βn) and of its
technological learning associated with learning by doing, which broadly reflects the “Verdoorn effect”, represented by the








Obviously, the Verdoorn effect introduces positive dynamic impulses (a virtuous circle) into the system, to the benefit
of the country which grows more quickly.
The distinctive aspect of Verspagen’s model is the form of the function for technical progress in the South –ts, in









Equation (5) indicates a non-linear relation between the gap G and the rate of technical progress in the South, ts, given
by the term G.e-G/δ.43 Up to a certain point, the technology gap stimulates the international dissemination of technology,
because of the possibilities of imitation open to the more backward countries. This stimulus depends not only on the level of
the gap but also on the parameter δ, which represents a measure of the “intrinsic learning capacity” of the South. The
maximum rate of dissemination of technology to the South is obtained when G = δ. After that critical value is reached,
dissemination weakens as the gap widens.
The higher the value of δ, the greater the international spread of technical progress, for a given value of the gap G.44
The learning capacity of the South (δ) is associated with its production structure and science and technology institutions.









+ 2.ε.η.λ.G - a.G.e-G/δ) / (1 - α.λ) (6)
43 The effects of autonomous innovation and the learning-
by-doing mechanism in the South are in no way different from





that the rate of autonomous innovation in the North is higher
than in the South.
44 When δ tends towards infinity, the international dissemina-
tion of technology becomes a linear function of the gap, which
is the assumption implicit in the linear “catching-up” models.
See, for example, Fagerberg (1988).
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Equation (6) shows that the gap closes (dG/dt < 0) when the international dissemination of technology exceeds the di-
vergence effect produced by the autonomous innovation differential and the Verdoorn effect.45 The evolution of the gap
over time is described in figure 1, where the straight line L represents the first two terms of the numerator in the equation
(βn - βs + 2.ε.η.λ.G), while the curve R represents the last term (a.G.e -G/δ), so that:
dG/dt = (L - R) / (1 - α.λ)
For values of the gap between GA and GF, there will be technological convergence, since the growth rate of the gap
over time becomes negative. For values of G greater than GA or less than GF, there will be technological divergence. It may
be noted that A represents an unstable equilibrium point, whereas F represents a stable equilibrium. Although the gap never
closes completely (unless βn - βs = 0), point F represents the constant minimum value of the steady-state gap.
The position of point F may be changed by changing parameter δ, which is subject, as noted earlier, to the influence of
industrial and technological policy. If the value of δ is increased, the curve for the international dissemination of technology
R moves up (generating curve R*) and the stable-state equilibrium is obtained for a lower value of the technology gap,
G*F* < GF. This is how policies designed to increase the capacity for the absorption of technology in the South bring
about a change in the equilibrium value of the gap.









) + 2.ε.η.G - α.a.G.e-G/δ] / (1 - α.λ) (7)
The effect of the gap on the difference between the growth rates of North and South (D = yn - ys) includes a
competitiveness effect and a dissemination-of-technology effect, as described in equation (7). The greater the gap, the
greater will be the competitive advantage of the North, thus increasing the differential between the growth rates. This effect
is partly offset by the dissemination of technology, which increases growth in the South. The net effect of the gap will be
given by the difference between the above two effects, i.e., by the sign of the difference [α.(βn - βs) + 2.ε.η.G] - α.a.G.e-G/δ.
Figure 2 summarizes the effects of the technology gap and autonomous innovation rates on the evolution over
time of the gap and of growth rates in North and South, for a given value of the parameter δ. If we multiply both
terms of the equation by 1/α we obtain the straight line L’ = βn - βs + (2.ε.η.G) / α, while R continues to be the same curve
as in figure 1.
Thus, we have:
D = (L’ - R) / α.(1 - α.λ)
FIGURE 1
Dynamics of the technology gap
FIGURE 2
Dynamics of the gap and growth





2.ε.η.λ.G < a.G.e-G/δ, where the left-hand side of the inequal-
ity represents the effect of the autonomous innovation rates and
the “Verdoorn effect” and the right-hand side represents the in-
ternational dissemination of technology.
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Thus:
(i) for G > GA, both D and G increase steadily (growing divergence in terms of growth and technological capacity);
(ii) for GB < G < GA, there will be divergence in growth rates but technological convergence;
(iii) for GC < G < GB, there will be simultaneous technological convergence and convergence of growth rates;
(iv) for GF < G < GC, there will be technological convergence but divergence in growth rates, and
(v) for G < GF there will be divergence in D and G.
When the gap reaches its stable equilibrium at F (where dG/dt = 0) there will continue to be a positive differential in
the growth rates of North and South (D > 0). The model permits a transitional dynamic, however, in which D < 0 (a situa-
tion of emulation), which corresponds to the situation indicated in sub-paragraph (iii) above. In this case, the positive effects
of the dissemination of technology on the rate of technical change in the South exceed the effects of the greater competitive-
ness of the North on exports and growth (these latter effects being determined by the existence of a differential, in absolute
terms, between the respective technological capacities). Thus, the model suggests that there may be convergence during cer-
tain periods (transitional dynamic) but does not envisage the elimination of the difference in growth rates between North
and South.46
46 If it were assumed that there is no link between exports and
growth (formally, ε = 0), then growth would depend solely on
the direct effect of technology. This would be the case in an
economy with permanent full employment, in which growth in-
creases in line with increases in productivity, without changes
in demand (through competitiveness) giving rise to any differ-
ences in growth rates between countries. The straight lines L
and L’ become horizontal and coincide perfectly with each
other, meaning that the technological convergence automati-
cally induces convergence in growth rates. At the steady equi-
librium point, both dG/dt and D will be equal to zero.
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APPENDIX 3
The simulation model of Dosi and Fabiani
The starting point for this model is provided by the firm’s decisions on how much it wishes to invest in research and devel-
opment (R&D). These are defined on the basis of a simple rule: a percentage of total sales in the preceding period.
Formally:
R&Dij (t) = a1 ij.Yij (t-1) (1)
where R&D is the investment in innovation or imitation in the period t, a1ij is a parameter reflecting the decision-making
rule, and Yij(t-1) is the total sales of firm i of country j in period (t-1).47
Through a two-stage stochastic process,48 the R&D efforts give rise to increases in productivity associated with the
discovery of an innovation or the successful imitation of competitors. Thus, the technological dynamic defines the evolution
of the productivity of each firm, designated as πij (t).
Price formation follows the rule of the application of a mark-up over costs:
Pij (t) = [wj (t) / πij (t)].(1 + a2ij) (2)
where wj (t) is the level of wages in country j and a2ij is a parameter which reflects the mark-up behaviour. The model has
only one production factor: labour.
Competitiveness is defined as a function of the exchange rate and prices.49
Eij (t) = ρj (t) / Pij (t) (3)
where Eij (t) is the competitiveness of firm i of country j, and ρj is the exchange rate of country j. Competitiveness governs
the evolution of the firm’s share in the domestic and foreign markets, in line with the following equations:
∆f kij (t,t+1) = a 3j.[Eij (t) / EM k (t) - 1].f kij (t) (4)
EM k (t) = Σi Σj f kij (t).Eij (t) (5)
where f kij is the share in market k of firm i of country j, Eij is the competitiveness of firm i, and EM k is the average com-
petitiveness in market k.50 Thus, k represents the different national markets. Obviously, if k is not the same as j, it will
represent an external market for the firms of country j.
47 The model assumes that decisions on technological innova-
tion and imitation are the result of “routine” behaviour: that is
to say, they are based on fixed rules and are independent of
other events. The authors say that although this rather an ex-
treme assumption, there are good empirical and theoretical rea-
sons for expecting inertial forms of behaviour in uncertain and
changing contexts.
48 The probability of obtaining an innovation in period t is de-
fined as Pr {Iij (t) = 1} = 1-exp {-φ.Inij (t)}, where Inij is the
number of researchers of firm i of country j seeking innova-
tions, Iij is a binary variable which can have the values 0 or 1,
and φ is a parameter which depends on the technological oppor-
tunities of the sector. Higher values of φ indicate greater
facility for finding new products or processes because of the
number of researchers. In a second stage, if the innovation
effort {Iij (t) = 1} is successful, the increase in productivity de-
riving from this is the result of a Poisson distribution with a
mean of λ, where λ also depends on the technological opportu-
nities of the sector (for example, λ could be expected to be
higher in the informatics sector than in the textile sector). Simi-
lar equations are formulated for the imitation process. In this
case, the probability of successful imitation will be a function
of the number of researchers assigned to the search for imita-
tions and of a parameter χ which reflects the difficulty of imita-
tion in that specific sector. This parameter depends on certain
characteristics of the technology, such as the extent to which
know-how can be disseminated through manuals, the role of ex-
perience, patents and industrial secrets, the accumulability of
technical capabilities, etc. The increase in productivity expected
from imitation is defined as an inverse function of the distance
between the current productivity of the firm and that corre-
sponding to the best technological practice in the sector.
49 Although Dosi and Fabiani work with two sectors, in the
present case we posit the existence of only a single sector in the
economy, in order to simplify the presentation of the model.
50 The average competitiveness is defined as the sum of the
competitiveness of all firms i of all countries j selling their
goods on market k, weighted by the respective market share of
each firm i in market k. Emk takes account of the competitive-
ness of all the firms operating in a given national market.
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